Secretary-General
of the International Association of Judges
SELECTION
AND APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES:
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION
AND DE FACTO PRACTICE (*)
|
Contents: 1.
Selection and Appointment of Judges in the Different Legal Systems. – 2. The Selection of Judges in the Italian Legal System. – 3. The Selection of Judges in Recommendation No. R (2010)
12 of the Council of Europe. – 4. The Selection of
Judges in the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. – 5. The Selection and the Appointment of Judges in the
Universal Charter of the International Association of Judges. The General
Framework of the Charter. – 6. Rules of the Universal
Charter of the International Association of Judges on Judicial Selection and Appointment. – 7. Councils for the
Judiciary in the Universal Charter of the International Association of
Judges. |
1. Selection and Appointment
of Judges in the Different Legal Systems.
From a general point of view it should be observed that selection,
recruitment and appointment of judges are carried out in many different ways in
the various systems throughout the world[1].This variety is
also present in Europe, where every imaginable system for the selection of
candidates for the judiciary is to be found, including election by popular
ballot, as in certain Swiss cantons.
Of course, each method has its advantages and its drawbacks.
a)
The first method consists in conferring the choice of
judges on the executive or legislative authorities: while, on the one hand,
this serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the judicial appointment, the heavy
dependence of the judiciary on the other powers, together with the political
implications, carries obvious risks.
b) Election by the
electorate is the method that confers on judges the highest level of
legitimacy, as it comes straight from the people. However, this system obliges
the judge to conduct a humiliating, and sometimes demagogic, electoral
campaign, inevitably with the financial backing of a political party, which
sooner or later might ask for a favour in return. Furthermore, the judge might
be tempted to tailor his judgments to his electorate.
c)
Co-option by the judiciary itself offers the advantage
of being able to choose the judges who are best prepared technically, but there
is a strong risk of conservatism and cronyism.
d) Nomination by a
committee of judges and legal academics (preferably appointed by an independent
body representing the judiciary) following a public competition, constitutes
the final system, as currently applied in a number of countries.
It would be impossible to
summarise here the diversity of methods adopted throughout Europe and the world
for the recruitment of judges. In an attempt to cover this topic in the best
possible way, I propose to identify (while bearing in mind the principle of
independence) the categories into which the various systems fall.
The first thing to note is
that a university qualification in legal studies is required nearly everywhere.
A minimum age together with “good character” is also a requirement laid down by
law nearly everywhere. Having said this, the system of competition is certainly
preponderant in Western and Southern Continental Europe (with some notable
exceptions such as, for example, the Swiss cantons, where judges are elected by
the people or by parliament). Such a competition may be open, in some cases, to
any person with a law degree (subject to the conditions established by the
various laws), or else to persons whom one could term “specialists,” in that they
not only have a legal qualification, but also some form of specialisation or
practical experience.
Moreover, depending on the
country concerned, the competition can give either direct access to the
judiciary, subject to the completion of a period of initial training under the
supervision of the High Council for the Judiciary (such was for a very long
time the case, for example, in Italy, where now a School for the Judiciary
exists), or access to a training institution (such is the case, for example, in
France, the Netherlands and Portugal; the result is practically the same in
Germany, although there the selection is formally made by the minister of
justice of each Land (Region), but on
the basis of rigorously objective criteria and as a result of a long and
serious training which precedes the choice of career and is common to judges, lawyers,
notaries and academicians; the system of competition is also to be found in the
Baltic states and in Turkey.
By way of contrast, the Common
Law systems and those of the European Nordic states are characterised either by
the complete absence of any competition for access to the judiciary, or by the
absence of a competition in the strict sense: here, appointment to the
judiciary is primarily the culmination of a training process, a cursus
honorum, which candidates complete in the field, even though the Commission
for Judicial Appointments–which provides, in the U.K., an independent mechanism
for applicants for judicial office who feel that their candidacy has not been
considered fairly–and the setting up of a Judicial College, opened new
perspectives in this field[2].
Of course this kind of system–an
appointment by the Executive or Legislature, which is sometimes “prepared” by a
selection operated by a special appointment commission, which is composed of
members of the judiciary, but also of the government and of representative of
the “civil society” –is widely followed in Common Law systems throughout the
world. A peculiar case is constituted by the United States of America, where
federal judges are appointed by the President of the United States, and
approved by a vote of the Senate whereas State judges are either appointed by
the governor, or elected by the people.
Obviously, under the first
type of systems (those which are based on a public competition), it is the
boards appointed to carry out the task of selecting candidates and the initial
training institutions which play the determining role in selecting new judges,
even if the formal instrument of nomination carries the signature of the
Minister of Justice or the President of the Republic. In the other systems,
however, the influence of the executive is (or can be) very considerable.
However, in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Scandinavian countries, other
factors (such as the legal tradition, the widespread respect for the judiciary,
the social and economical position of judges, the existence of the “contempt of
court”) guarantee, on the one hand, the quality of the selection and, on the
other hand, the maintaining of a situation of separation between the
authorities and an independent judiciary.
In the countries of the former
communist bloc the situation seems somewhat complex and difficult to grasp.
The overall conclusion from
this is that the situation is still weighted too heavily in favour of the
political authorities lato sensu (the
executive, but also, in several cases, the legislature). While it is true that
very often “qualifications boards” are involved (as for example in the Russian
Federation), it is by no means clear how such bodies are composed, or, in
particular, what criteria are followed, or what effective powers such boards
have to determine in practice, in relation to the executive, the actual choice
of candidates when their number exceeds the number of posts available.
The same is true of systems
where Judicial Councils only have a consultative function in this regard (in,
for example, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Czech Republic or
Slovakia), even if the perverse effects of a system that accords considerable
power to the executive authorities (or to the legislature in systems where
judges are elected) may be alleviated by the intervention of the association of
judges (as for example in the Czech Republic). Conversely, the intervention in
such a process of a High Council for the Judiciary with decision-making powers
in this regard (as opposed to a merely advisory function) certainly provides a
very reassuring guarantee (such is the case, for example, in Croatia, Poland,
Romania and Slovenia)[3].
2. The Selection of
Judges in the Italian Legal System.
Access to the
profession of judge and public prosecutor in Italy takes place through a public
competitive examination pursuant to Article 106, paragraph 1, of the
Constitution. Rules on the entry to the profession of judge and prosecutor have
been changed over the last years, on the one hand to simplify and expedite the
examination procedure and, on the other, to promote the development of a
cultural basis common to all the members of the legal world connected to the
activities linked to the exercise of the judicial function: judges and
prosecutors, notaries and lawyers. The legislator has thus constituted Schools
of Specialisation for the Legal Professions, which are post‑graduate
schools set up within the Universities for law‑graduate students that
want to enter the legal professions (Legislative Decree No. 398/97). Nowadays
attendance to this school and the final certificate issued by it, are one of
the pre-requisites to apply for the competitive examination to become judge. As
an alternative, candidates must have passed the bar exam, or must have
successfully passed an internship period of 18 months in a court as an
assistant to a judge.
With a view to
rationalising and speeding up the relevant procedure, and with a view to
implementing the assessment of the candidates in a reasonable time and with
the required accuracy, the public examination for entry to the Judiciary has
been completely amended by the aforesaid Legislative Decree No. 398/97 and the
amendment of Article 123 of the judicial system. The–already existing–written
and oral exams were temporarily sided by a computerised preliminary test on the
subject matters dealt with in the written exam.
The computerised
preliminary test was then subsequently set aside within the new framework of
the public examination developed by Act no. 48/2001. The whole matter was then
reformed by the Legislative Decree No. 160 of 2006, subsequently amended by the
law No. 111 of 2007.
The competitive
public examination for judges and prosecutors consists of three written exams
(on: civil, criminal and administrative law) and an oral exam on the main legal
subjects (see Article 1 of the above mentioned Legislative Decree No. 160 of
2006).
The competitive
examination for judges/prosecutors is published by the Minister of Justice,
pursuant to a decision of the High Council for the Judiciary, which sets the
number of positions. The examining committee, appointed by the High Council, is
chaired by a judge/prosecutor with at least twenty-four years of seniority. It
consists further of twenty judges/prosecutors with at least twelve years of
seniority, five university law professors and three lawyers (see Article 1 of
the above mentioned Law No. 111 of 2007). The classification drawn up by the
commission, which is based on the total sum of the votes given to each
candidate in each individual test, is then approved by the High Council[4].
3. The Selection of Judges in
Recommendation No. R (2010) 12 of the Council of Europe.
Faced with those
possible alternatives, that I have explained in previous paragraphs, Articles
44-48 of the 2010 recommendation show a marked preference for the elimination
of all executive influence from the appointment of judges. The general rule in
this regard is in fact explicitly stated in Article 46: “The authority taking
decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the
executive and legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence,
at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their
peers.”
The following Article
47 is, by contrast, clearly conceived as an exception to the rule of Article
46. That is to say, the recommendation appears to view as exceptional a country
where “the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of
state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the
selection and career of judges”. Here a very serious problem faces the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where historical “tradition” has not
always been democratically based, and constitutions and laws instituted after
the fall of the Berlin Wall–often under the influence of the Common Law
systems–have led to systems of appointment and control over judges’ careers
that afford them no protection from attempts at undue influence on the part of
the political authorities.
It is true that Article
47 tries to suggest, in its second part, some expedients aimed at limiting the
discretionary power of the executive (or legislative) authorities. This is
particularly the case, for example, with the creation of “an independent and
competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without
prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in
Chapter IV).” Unfortunately, it is the very lack of almost any detailed and
reliable information on the practice actually followed that gives rise to
concern. The author of this essay is well aware–having visited nearly all the
countries concerned–that between the letter of the law and the daily reality of
the judge’s duties, between official speeches and private conversation, there
often lurks an abyss.
4. The Selection of Judges in
the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary, approved in 1985, dedicate a special Article (see Article 10)
the issues of “Qualification, selection and training.”
According to this
provision, “Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of
integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any
method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper
motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a
person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a
requirement that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the
country concerned shall not be considered discriminatory.”
Clearly, no stand
is taken on the delicate topic of the bodies in charge of selecting and appointing
judges.
Furthermore, no
directive is given on what should be considered as the best methods. The United
Nations were in 1985 and still are now well aware that very different methods
are known and practiced all around the world. Not all of them are able to
assure posts to the best candidates, nor to ensure a full compliance with the
principle of judicial independence. However, the one and only recommendation
given by the Basic Principles is that that such methods should “safeguard
against judicial appointments for improper motives.”
Unfortunately, no
explanation is given on what an “improper motive” should be, although, taken
into account the other principles of the document and the general “spirit” of
it, it appears evident that “improper motives” are those which could undermine
judicial independence.
In the current process of
internationalization of the principles on the independence of the judiciary, an
increasingly relevant role is played by the International Association of Judges[6].
The International Association of Judges (IAJ)—founded in
Salzburg (Austria) in 1953—is a professional, non-political, international
organization, bringing together national associations of judges, not individual
judges, approved by the Central Council for admission to the Association. The
main aim of this organisation is to safeguard the independence of the judiciary,
which is an essential requirement of the judicial function, guaranteeing human
rights and freedom[7]. The IAJ currently
encompasses 90 such national associations or representative groups, from the
five continents[8].
During its 66 years
of existence the IAJ has been constantly deploying its efforts to safeguard
judicial independence, as a cornerstone of the rule of law, tackling delicate
cases and situations in all parts of the world.
Between 1993 and 1995 the
different regional components of the IAJ adopted charters on the statute of
judges namely: (a) the “Judges’ Charter
in Europe” adopted by the European Association of Judges in 1993[9]; (b) the “Judges’
Charter in Ibero-America” (Estatuto del
Juez iberoamericano) adopted in 1995 by the Ibero-American Group of the IAJ[10]; (c) the “Judges’
Charter in Africa” adopted in 1995 by the African Group of the IAJ[11]. Some years later,
in 1999, after a long work of reflection, the Central Council of the IAJ,
during its meeting in Taiwan, adopted a universal Charter of the Judge[12].
As of
The need for a new
Universal Charter was made evident by the many changes occurring during the
last years: the number of IAJ member countries grew from 43 (in 1999) to 87 (in
2017), bringing in new experiences, legal systems and traditions; at the same
time several international organisations issued charters, recommendations and
declarations on subjects pertaining to judicial status[14].
Therefore, during the IAJ meeting in Foz do Iguaçu in 2014
the Central Council approved the proposal of the Presidency Committee to update
the Charter adopted in Taiwan in 1999. During the Barcelona meeting (2015) a
working group was set up, with the task of preparing a draft for a new Charter[15]. The draft
Universal Charter was discussed within the working group during the meeting in
Mexico City in October 2016 and during the springtime Regional Groups meetings
in April and May
This is the general
framework in which the new Universal Charter of the Judge has been drafted,
discussed and adopted by the IAJ.
The document is
composed of nine articles, dealing, respectively, with the following subjects:
(1) General Principles; (2) External Independence; (3) Internal Independence;
(4) Recruitment and Training; (5) Appointment, Promotion and Assessment; (6)
Ethics; (7) Discipline; (8) Remuneration, Social Protection and Retirement; (9)
Applicability of the Charter.
The main new
features of the 2017 Charter, when compared to its 1999 version, may be
summarized as follows:
·
Devoting a whole new chapter to the aspect of Internal
Independence;
·
Recognizing and emphasising the role played by
Councils for the Judiciary;
·
Focusing on the principles of tenure and security of
office;
·
Banning the so-called “reappointment procedures”;
·
Recognizing the pivotal role played by initial and on
service training activities;
·
Emphasising the role of judicial efficiency;
·
Enucleating a series of autonomous principles of
judicial ethics, underlying the role of “Judicial Codes of Conduct”;
·
Recognizing the applicability of the main rules of the
Charter not only to all persons exercising judicial functions, including
non-professional judges, but also to members of the public prosecution service.
Selection (or recruitment) and
appointment of judges are contemplated in two different Articles of the new
Charter (4-1 and 5-1, respectively), as in many legal systems they may be the
effect of two different kinds of procedures, often made by different organs.
Actually, according
to Article 4-1, “The recruitment or selection of judges must be based only on
objective criteria, which may ensure professional skills; it must be done by
the body described in Article 2.3.
Selection must be
done independently of gender, ethnic or social origin, philosophical and
political opinions, or religious beliefs.”
According to
Article 5-1, “The selection and each appointment of a judge must be carried out
according to objective and transparent criteria based on proper professional
qualification.
The selection
should be carried out by the independent body defined by Article 2-3 of this
Charter, or an equivalent body.”
It is therefore
clear that, as far as selection (or recruitment) and appointment of judges are
concerned, what matters is that both proceedings must be inspired by the same
basic rules, which is to say they must be “based only on objective criteria,
which may ensure professional skills” (Article 4-1), or “carried out according
to objective and transparent criteria based on proper professional
qualification” (Article 5-1). Both proceedings must be done by (or under the
supervision of) the Council for the Judiciary, or another independent body
described by Article 2-3.
7. Councils for the
Judiciary in the Universal Charter of the International Association of Judges.
It is self-evident,
after what has been explained in the previous paragraphs, that a crucial role in
the selection and appointment process of judges must be played by the Councils
for the Judiciary or by equivalent bodies.
Article 2-3 of the
Charter provides for as follows:
“Article 2-3 –
Council for the Judiciary
In order to
safeguard judicial independence a Council for the Judiciary, or another
equivalent body, must be set up, save in countries where this independence is
traditionally ensured by other means.
The Council for the
Judiciary must be completely independent of other State powers.
It must be composed
of a majority of judges elected by their peers, according to procedures
ensuring their largest representation.
The Council for the
Judiciary can have members who are not judges, in order to represent the
variety of civil society. In order to avoid any suspicion, such members cannot
be politicians. They must have the same qualifications in terms of integrity,
independence, impartiality and skills of judges. No member of the Government or
of the Parliament can be at the same time member of the Council for the
Judiciary.
The Council for the
Judiciary must be endowed with the largest powers in the fields of recruitment,
training, appointment, promotion and discipline of judges.
It must be foreseen
that the Council can be consulted by the other State powers on all possible
questions concerning judicial status and ethics, as well as on all subjects
regarding the annual budget of Justice and the allocation of resources to the
courts, on the organisation, functioning and public image of judicial
institutions.”
The opening
statement on the subject of the Councils for the Judiciary marks a clear
difference with the existing international documents in the field of judicial
independence. Actually, the IAJ Charter provides that “In order to safeguard
judicial independence a Council for the Judiciary, or another equivalent body,
must be set up, save in countries where this independence is traditionally
ensured by other means” (see Article 2-3, Para. 1).
A comparison with
Article 26 of the Recommendation No. R 2010/12 of the Council of Europe may be
interesting. Whereas the latter document only says that Councils of Justice are
organs “that seek to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and of
individual judges and thereby to promote the efficient functioning of the
judicial system,” with no recommendation or prescription to set up such bodies,
the new IAJ Universal Charter is closer to recent European developments. For
example, Resolution No. 1685 (2009) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on “Allegations of politically motivated abuses of the
criminal justice system in Council of Europe member states”[16] calls on Germany
to “consider setting up a system of judicial self-administration, taking into
account the federal structure of the German judiciary, along the lines of the
judicial councils existing in the vast majority of European states, as a matter
of securing the independence of the judiciary in future.”
As far as the
composition of such bodies is concerned, the new Universal Charter clearly
states that they “must be composed of a majority of judges elected by their
peers, according to procedures ensuring their largest representation” (Article
2-3, Para. 3). This provision is more advanced than its equivalent within the
already mentioned Recommendation No. R 2010/12, according to which (only) “Not
less than half the members of such councils should be judges chosen by their
peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside
the judiciary” (see Article 27). The rule about a majority of judges is also
enshrined in the already mentioned resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, which invited, among other things, France to “consider
restoring a majority of judges and prosecutors within the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature or ensuring that the members
appointed by political bodies also include representatives of the opposition
and making the Conseil supérieur de la
magistrature’s opinion binding also for decisions concerning prosecutors.”
Also Article 13 of
the already mentioned “Magna Carta of European Judges” (CCEJ) prescribes that “To ensure independence of judges, each State
shall create a Council for the Judiciary or another specific body, itself
independent from legislative and executive powers, endowed with broad
competences for all questions concerning their status as well as the
organisation, the functioning and the image of judicial institutions. The
Council shall be composed either of judges exclusively or of a substantial
majority of judges elected by their peers. The Council for the Judiciary shall
be accountable for its activities and decisions.”
Another important
provision of the new Universal Charter approved by the IAJ states that “No
member of the Government or of the Parliament can be at the same time member of
the Council for the Judiciary” (Article 2-3, Para. 4). Actually, we know that
in some legal systems of countries, belonging to the former Communist Block,
the Minister of Justice is at the same time member (or even President) of the
Council of Justice: a practice which has already been condemned by the European
Court for human rights[17].
Finally, according
to the new IAJ Charter, Councils for the Judiciary cannot be merely advisorial
bodies, as they “must be endowed with the largest powers in the fields of
recruitment, training, appointment, promotion and discipline of judges”
(Article 2-3, Para. 5). The reference to “the largest powers” marks the need
for a body which actually, instead of only issuing opinions, takes binding
decisions on judges’ careers.
(*) Paper submitted to the international conference on
the subject “Safeguarding the Independence and Conditions of Service of
Judicial Officers,” organised by the African Group of the International
Association of Judges in co-operation with JOASA (Judicial Officers Association
of South Africa) in Cape Town (South Africa) on 2-6 June, 2019.
[1] For a comparative study of the systems of
recruitment, appointment and training of judges in the countries belonging to
the International Association of Judges see International Association
of Judges
- “Justice in the World” Foundation,
Traité d’organisation judiciaire comparée,
I, Zurich-Brussels, 1999. On this topic see also Borgna and Cassano, Il giudice e
il principe. Magistratura e potere politico in Italia e in Europa, Rome,
1997, p. 107 et seq.; Oberto, Verardi and Viazzi, Il
reclutamento e la formazione professionale dei magistrati in Italia e in
Europa, in Dogliotti, Figone, Oberto,
et al., L’esame di uditore giudiziario, Milan,
1997, p. 41 et seq.; Oberto,
Recrutement et formation des magistrats en Europe : une étude comparative,
Strasbourg, 2003; Id., La formazione dei magistrati alla luce dei
principi internazionali e dei profili di diritto comparato, Padova, 2008.
On the system of recruitment of Italian
judges, see Oberto, Recrutement, formation et carrière des
magistrats en Italie. The article has been available since
29 June 1999 on the following web page:
https://www.giacomooberto.com/tbilissi.htm;
Oberto, Recrutement et
formation des magistrats : le système italien dans le cadre des principes
internationaux sur le statut des magistrats et l’indépendance du pouvoir
judiciaire, in Rivista di diritto privato, 2001, p. 717 et seq. (the text has been available
since 29 March 2001 on the following web page: https://www.giacomooberto.com/csm/rapport.htm); Bartole, Per una
valutazione comparatistica dell’ordinamento del potere giudiziario nei paesi
dell’Europa continentale, in Studium
juris, 1996, p. 531 et seq.; Dogliotti,
Figone, Oberto et al., L’esame di uditore giudiziario,
op. cit; Caianiello, Formazione e selezione dei giudici in una
ipotesi comparativa, in Giurisprudenza
italiana, 1998, p. 387 et seq. For an examination of the judiciary systems of Europe see the Council
of Europe publication under the title L’Europe
judiciaire, Strasbourg, 2000 (the book also contains–in relation to some
countries–information on the recruitment and training of judges). Of course,
mention has to be done here also to European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (Cepej), Evaluation of European Judicial Systems, available at the following
web site: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/cepej-work/evaluation-of-judicial-systems.
[2] Information on the Judicial Appointments Commission
is available on the following web site: http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk;
for the Judicial College see: https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/training-support/judicial-college/.
[3] For further details on this topic
see Oberto, Recrutement et
formation des magistrats en Europe : une étude comparative, cit.; Id., La formazione dei magistrati alla luce dei principi internazionali e
dei profili di diritto comparato, cit.
[4] For further details on this topic
see Oberto, Recrutement et
formation des magistrats en Europe : une étude comparative, cit.; Id., La
formazione dei magistrati alla luce dei principi internazionali e dei profili
di diritto comparato, cit.
[5] See:
https://www.giacomooberto.com/coe_raccomandazione_2010/coe_rec_2010_12_e.htm
[6] All relevant events concerning the
International Association of Judges are published in its official web site: https://www.iaj-uim.org. Further
information (in Italian) on the themes of this article, a comprehensive
bibliography on the subject of judicial independence and a full version of this
contribution is available in Oberto,
Un nuovo statuto per un nuovo giudice,
https://www.giacomooberto.com/Oberto_Un_nuovo_statuto_per_un_nuovo_giudice_2017.htm,
also in Contratto e impresa/Europa,
2019, p. 49 et. seq.
[7] According to Article 3 of IAJ’s Statutes,
“1. The objects of the Association are as follows:
(a) to safeguard the independence of the
judicial authority, as an essential requirement of the judicial function and
guarantee of human rights and freedom.
(b)
to safeguard the constitutional and moral standing of the judicial authority.
(c)
to increase and perfect the knowledge and the understanding of Judges by
putting them in touch with Judges of other countries, and by enabling them to
become familiar with the nature and functioning of foreign organizations, with
foreign laws and, in particular, with how those laws operate in practice.
(d)
to study together judicial problems, whether these are of regional, national or
universal interest, and to arrive at better solutions to them.”
[8] The list of the 90 member associations
available here: https://www.iaj-uim.org/member-associations/.
[10] See: https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Estatuto-del-juez-iberoamericano.pdf.
[13] All documents and conclusions issued by
the IAJ’s 1st Study Commission are available here: https://www.iaj-uim.org/study-commissions/.
[14] See e.g. the following documents:
·
UN Basic Principles on the independence of the
judiciary, adopted in 1985: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Handouts/Handout4-2.pdf;
·
Recommendation 94/12 of the Committee of ministers of
the Council of Europe, elaborated in 1994 and updated in 2010 (Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)12 on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities): https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CM/Rec(2010)12&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383&direct=true;
·
European Charter on the statute for judges, elaborated
by the Council of Europe in 1998: https://rm.coe.int/16807473ef;
·
Various opinions of the Consultative Council of
European Judges (CCJE) since 2001 and
particularly the “Magna Carta of European judges,” which is a compilation of
the above mentioned opinions, drafted in 2010: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CCJE-MC(2010)3&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864&direct=true;
·
Bangalore Principles on judicial conduct (2002) and
the resolution 2006/23 of the Economic and Social Council of the UN: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf; https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/corruption_judicial_res_e.pdf;
·
Report of the Venice Commission on the independence of
the judicial system (study n. 494/2008): http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)004-e;
·
Kiev recommendations on the independence of the
judiciary in Eastern Europe, adopted in 2010: http://www.osce.org/odihr/KyivRec;
·
Opinions of the European Network of Councils of
Justice: http://www.encj.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=24&Itemid=98&lang=en;
Other associations, such as the
Commonwealth Association of Judges, have adopted as well standards aiming at
assuring the independence of the judiciary (in particular the “Victoria Falls
Declaration” in 1994, or the statute of Commonwealth judges in 2013). For a
full list of such declarations see Oberto,
Un nuovo statuto per un nuovo giudice,
cit., § 3.
[15] The working group was composed of Mr
Christophe Régnard, President of the IAJ (France), President of the working
group; Mr Giacomo Oberto, Secretary-General of the IAJ (Italy); Ms. Janja
Roblek (Slovenia); Ms. Julie Dutil (Canada); Ms. Allyson Duncan (USA); Mr
Walter Barone (Brazil); Mr. Mario Morales (Porto Rico); Ms. Marie Odile
Thiakane (Senegal); Mr Scheik Kone (Mali). To this work was also associated Mr
Günter Woratsch, Honorary President of the IAJ (Austria), in his quality of
President of the Council of Honorary Presidents.
[17] See e.g. Volkov vs Ukraine (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115871;
Gerovska Popčevska v. the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159769.